The main purpose of this research is to study the 
Introduction
Successful corporate governance in banks is one of the key factors affecting the overall performance of banks. Due to the lack of many research studies of the banking sector in transition countries such as Kosovo (Uwuigbe, 2011) and a rather new banking sector in Kosovo, this research claims to bridge the gap in existing corporate governance literature in the banking sector. According to the authors Heidi and Marleen, banking supervision cannot function properly if banks fail to implement a proper and effective corporate governance framework (Heidi & Marleen, 2003) . Therefore, the main motivation of this research is the claim to analyze and study the relationship between corporate governance variables and financial performance of the banking sector in Kosovo.
To analyze these relationships, among others, the Pearson correlation coefficient, and regression analysis will be applied in relation to corporate governance variables and banking sector performance. The key variables of corporate governance will be (i) the size of the board of directors and (ii) the independence of the board of directors (the ratio between non-executive directors 2 and the total number of board members).
Corporate Governance has been partially developed as a response to the agency's problem, in order to respond to the difficulties in making sure that the entity's shareholders are able to exercise sufficient control over their agents, directors and managers. Corporate governance is a system under which banks are directed and controlled (Cadbury Committee Report, 1992) . Corporate Governance is a set of relationships between directors, shareholders and other stakeholders of a company. At the same time it sets out the structure by which the banks objectives are set and the way in which the achievement of these objectives and the performance monitoring are determined (OECD Principles, 2015) .
A study by McKinsey in relation to corporate governance in 2008, suggests that investors are prepared to pay an additional premium to buy shares of companies which have enhanced corporate governance systems (McKinsey, 2008) . Some of the important indicators of good corporate governance for investors are the fact that the board had a majority of independent non -executive directors, the fact that the directors owned a significant share of the shares and that the compensation was based on shares, the fact that the performance of board directors was made by formalized methods and providing good and timely responses to shareholders' information requests. The key participants in corporate governance are: Board of Directors, Management and Shareholders (Aebi, Sabato, Schmid, 2012) .
Just as in all corporations and banks, corporate governance plays an essential role. Given the specificities of the bank's operations, the general principles of good governance cannot be applied to all banks. Macey & O'Hara argue that banks are quite specific in their organizational structure, so their corporate governance needs to be looked at differently (O'Hara, 2003) . Banks are organized in different ways. Banks' assets are more specific, which makes them more difficult for their owners to monitor their banking activities. Banks are also subject to strict regulation by central banks due to deposit holdings, which has important implications for risk taking by bank managers and the moral hazard problem by banks. Another reason for banks to be treated differently is the role of stakeholder groups, such as depositors, debtors and regulators.
The weak and ineffective mechanisms of corporate governance in banks have been highlighted as the main factors contributing to the recent financial crisis. Deep changes in this area are needed to strengthen the stability of the financial sector (Marcinkowska, 2012) .The failure of a bank to pursue good practices in corporate governance and the lack of effective governance are among the most important internal factors that could endanger a bank's liquidity and solvency.
Corporate governance in the banking sector is important because this sector plays an essential role in the health and economic performance of a country (Saidi, 2004) . The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCSB), in its report on enhancing corporate governance in the banking sector, stressed that corporate governance in banks is essential for the international financial system and is needed to guarantee a sound ISSN: 2147-4486 Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders.
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financial system and development of sustainable economy of a country (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006).
Literature review
This part deals with the literature review in the area of corporate governance related to the topic of this research.
One of the big four audit firms "Deloitte" in collaboration with Nyenrode Business University has conducted a meta-analysis of scientific papers published during 2006-2016 on the impact of various corporate governance variables on entity performance (Deloitte, Neynrode Business University, 2016) . The research finds the presence of correlation between several corporate governance variables and entity performance. Some of the corporate governance variables with a correlation effect are specified to be: (i) the independence of the board of directors, (ii) the diversity of the board of directors; (iii) Compensation; (iv) the characteristics of the Executive Director (CEO); (v) oversight, and (vi) ownership structure. The following table presents the variables of corporate governance and their impact or performance effect based on this research. 
Variables

Impact on performance Board independence
A greater number of independent board members have an impact on improving the board's objectivity and its ability to present some views on various issues. However, with the increased size of the board, this may have an impact on the slowdown in the decision-making process.
Diversity of the board
Demographic diversity has a positive impact on performance. However, when diversity is mandated by law, this effect is not present.
Compensation
Compensation contributes to performance by coordinating shareholders' and management interests. Stock options for the CEO may work well in good times, but may not be effective when the firm's performance is stagnating.
CEO characteristics
If the CEO has a strong position, this has a positive effect on performance, but can lead to more risk-based decision-making.
Oversight
The active supervisory role of owners and boards has a positive effect on performance, especially in international companies.
Ownership structure
Institutional ownership has a positive impact on the quality of strategic decisions made by the board, engaging actively and having a prospective outlook.
Source: Deloitte (Deloitte, Neynrode Business University, 2016) .
Authors Belhaj and Mateus researched the effect of corporate governance on financial performance on eleven (11) European banks. The variables tested in this research paper were board size, board composition (independence), gender diversity and the CEO duality during 10-year period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . The results show that the board size and board gender diversity have a significant positive effect on bank performance. They found out that banks with larger number of board members and more female members had better financial performance. They also concluded that board composition (executive vs. non-executive) and CEO duality had no significant impact on the performance of the sampled European banks (Belhaj & Mateus, 2016 
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of corporate governance of the banking and insurance sector, but does not go on to show its impact on the banking sector performance (RIINVEST, 2009).
Therefore, to close as much as possible the knowledge gap on corporate governance of the banking sector in transition countries, this research will focus on the analysis of the impact of these concepts on the performance of the banking sector in Kosovo. The focus is on the banking industry because the problems of corporate governance are important in the banking sector as a result of the special role that this sector has in providing loans to natural and legal persons of the economy and maintaining the stability of the banking sector and its impact on economy as a whole.
Research and Methodology
Concerning the testing of the hypotheses of this research, these forms of data analysis will be applied: a) Correlation analysis -to analyze the relationship or correlation between dependent variables and independent variables (explanatory variables) -the correlation testing between them will also be performed. b) Descriptive statistics -from the summarized data the analysis of the mean, mode, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, which provide information about the overall tendency of the explanatory and dependent variables. d) Panel data 4 regression analysis -which includes panel data analysis technique, where data is analyzed both from time perspective and from the aspect of different banks (longitudinal study).
The population of this research consists of banks operating in Kosovo. Therefore, a benchmark sample includes all commercial banks operating in Kosovo for at least 12 consecutive years (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) so that the variables of corporate governance and those of financial performance can be comparable over the years.
The data for this research will be gathered directly from (i) audited annual financial reports of banks operating in Kosovo (secondary data), and (ii) through a questionnaire that is designed in accordance with the elements of the problem discussed in this research (primary data).
Based on the research objectives listed in the introductory section, the following hypotheses will be tested:
H1) H 0 : There is no significant positive relationship between the size of the board of directors and the performance of banks in Kosovo.
H2) H 0 : There is no significant positive relationship between the independence of the board of directors and the performance of banks in Kosovo.
To test the hypothesis this research uses fixed effect multiple regression panel data model which is divided into two main groups, those which, as a bank performance indicator have (ROA) and those which have the return on equity (ROE). In order to measure the specific impact of each of the above listed corporate governance indicators, specific models are developed below, each of which have an independent variable and other control variables. 
Independent variables (board of directors characteristics): Board of Directors Size
MBD
Expressed as a natural logarithm of total number of board of directors for each accounting year.
Board of Directors Independence PABD
The ratio between the number of non-executive directors to the total number of board directors for each accounting year subject to this research.
Control variables:
Bank Size MB Expressed as a natural logarithm of the total balance of bank assets at the balance sheet date (statement of financial position) for each accounting year.
Credit Risk RRK Expressed as the ratio between loan loss provision to total gross loans for each accounting year.
Deposits D Expressed as a natural logarithm of total deposits for each accounting year.
Liquidity Risk RRL Expressed as a ratio of gross loans and the total of deposits for each accounting year.
Findings
The two dependent variables (bank performance indicators) used in this research are Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). Based on the results of the descriptive statistics presented in table 4 we can conclude that during the 12 year period (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) , commercial banks in Kosovo have recorded an average ROA of 1.4% (0.014) and an average ROE of 12.8% (0.128). This means that on average, the banks, for every 1 euro of their total assets, have realized a net profit of 0.014 EURO, while for every 1 euro of their total equity, they realized net profit of 0.128 EURO. The maximum ROA over the same period was 8.7% (0.087), while the minimum ROA was -4% (-0.040). Meanwhile, the maximum ROE was 50% (0.500), while the minimum ROE was -28.3% (-0.283). Also, based on the standard deviation of 9.6% (0.096) for ROA and 12.5% (0.125) for ROE, we can conclude that the performance of banks in Kosovo has had a large variation range in ROA and ROE values from positive to negative ones. 
Source: author (XLSTAT)
Correlation analysis allows to empirically verify the presence or not of the relationship between the two factors (variables). This method of analysis does not indicate the level of influence (significance) of a variable to another, but only expresses the existence or not of a relationship or correlation. Table 5 presents a correlation results in the form of a matrix showing correlation coefficients along with the significance level for each dependent, independent, and control variable. As can be seen from the results, in almost all coefficients of correlation of independent or control variables the value does not exceed 0.90 (r≤0.90), which means that the presence of multicollinearity is not a problem, except for the correlation coefficient between deposit (D) and total assets (MB) which is 0.99, which is expected, as deposits have a direct impact on the total assets of a bank.
Based on the results presented in this table we can conclude the following:
(i) Dependent variables, ROA and ROE, have a positive correlation coefficient with all independent variables, respectively with independent variables of the board of directors (MBD, PABD). Almost all correlation coefficients have a high level of significance (credibility) equal to 95% (p≤0.05), respectively 99% (p≤0.01). Positive correlation coefficients imply that, with the increase in the values of the board of directors variables have an increasing impact on the financial performance of banks (ROA and ROE). These findings are consistent with the findings of the research by performed by Ondieki (2012), Bett (2014) , Ozcan (2016 ), Matari (2013 ), Pablo (2008 .
(ii) Dependent variables, ROA and ROE, have positive correlation coefficients with control variables such as (i) size of banks (MB), (ii) credit risk (RRK) and (iii) deposits (D) of 5% (p≤0.05), and 1% (p≤0.01), while the negative correlation with the liquidity risk (RRL). This implies that by increasing the size of banks, credit risk and bank deposits, there will be an increase in bank financial performance, expressed through ROA and ROE, while with increased liquidity risk there will be a decrease in banks' financial performance (negative impact). This finding is in line with the research findings of the authors Stanisic (2016) dhe Ozcan (2016) . These findings also confirm the theory that the larger the bank, the more it will have loans and other placements in its total assets, which result in net profit growth. Also, the more deposits the bank has, the more it can put them in the form of loans and this can bring higher net profits. However, the strongest and most significant correlation between the bank's control and performance variables (ROA and ROE) is in the variables of banks' size (r = 0.42 and r = 0.48) and deposits (r = 0.42 and r = 0.43). On the other hand, liquidity risk has a weak negative correlation (r = -0.21 and r = -0.14) with ROA and ROE and not quite significant (p = 0.05 and p = 0.19). Credit risk (RRK) also has a weak ISSN: Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders.
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positive correlation (r = 0.27 and r = 0.10) with ROA and ROE and not quite significant (p = 0.01 and p = 0.35). 
(1%).
To better derive the impact of the board of directors 'variables on banks' financial performance (ROA and ROE), and to eliminate the deficiencies of the two previous analysis (descriptive and correlation), the following section applies the fixed effect multiple regression analysis of panel data which will show the precise impact of independent and control variables on the financial performance of banks in Kosovo during 2006-2017 time period. This analysis is categorized as 'multivariate analysis'.
In table 6 we have presented fixed effect (FE) multiple regression results of panel data for all models of this research, with ROA and ROE as a dependent variable. Each model aims to derive the individual effect of each variable of the board of directors on the financial performance of commercial banks in Kosovo, while at the same time for all models the effect of control variables is also taken into account.
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant positive relationship between the size of the board of directors and the performance of banks in Kosovo
This hypothesis is tested by model 1a and model 1b specified in the econometric section. Model 1a is used to test the impact of the size of the board of directors on the financial performance of commercial banks in Kosovo over the period 2006-2017 expressed through ROA, while model 1b is used to test the same impact but through ROE as a dependent variable.
The regression results presented in table 6 show a significant and positive impact between the size of the Board of Directors (MBD) and the financial performance of commercial banks in Kosovo expressed through ROA and ROE as dependent variable. According to model 1a, which applies ROA as a performance metric, the regression coefficient is r = 0.0047 with a confidence level (significance) of p = 0.0000 (p≤1%). Also, according to model 1b, which applies ROE as performance metric the regression coefficient is r = 0.03867 with a confidence level of p = 0.0000 (p≤1%). This implies that the size of the board of directors has a significant positive impact on the ROA and ROE of commercial banks in Kosovo, and that an increase in the size of the board would have an increasing impact on the financial performance of banks, respectively, in the ISSN: Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders.
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growth of ROA and ROE. This result rejects the zero hypotheses (H0), where it is foreseen that there is no positive and significant relationship between the size of the board of directors and the performance of banks in Kosovo, so alternative hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The result of this hypothesis is in accordance with the findings of the research performed by Isik-Nice (2016), Mateu-Belaj (2016), Adams (2011), but contradicts with the findings of authors Dogan (2013) , Boussaada & Karmani (2015) .
Regarding the control variables included in the regression analysis, model 1a shows a significant positive impact between bank size (MB) (r = 2.64e-7, p = 0.0138) and ROA, which implies that an increase in bank size, will affect the bank's financial performance, in terms of ROA. Also, the results show a significant negative impact on total deposits (D) (r = -3.35e-7, p = 0.0104) and ROA, which implies that an increase in total deposits will negatively affect the ROA due to increased interest expense and the costs associated with holding the deposits. Other control variables such as credit risk (RRK) and liquidity risk (RRL) have shown positive relationships with ROA, but their effect is not significant (p = 0.0529 and p = 0.9468). Similar results were also noted in model 1b, where a significant positive impact was observed between the bank size (r = 2.64e-6, p = 0.0040) and ROE, and the credit risk (r = 1.1861, p = 0.0293), while a significant negative impact was observed between total deposits (r = 3.06e-6, p = 0.0038) and ROE. With regard to liquidity risk (RRL) (r = 0.01662, p = 0.6781), the impact on ROE is positive and not significant. The regression results presented in tables 6 show a significant and positive influence between the independence of the Board of Directors (PABD) and the financial performance of commercial banks in Kosovo expressed through ROA and ROE. According to model 2a, which applies ROA as performance measure, the regression coefficient is r = 0.0525 with a confidence level of p = 0.0029 (p≤1%). Also, according to model 2b, which applies ROE as performance measure, the regression coefficient is r = 0.3512 with a confidence level of p = 0.0148 (p≤5%). This implies that the independence of the board of directors, i.e. the level of non-executive (external) directors, has a significant positive impact on the ROA and ROE of commercial banks in Kosovo, and that an increase in this variable would have an increasing impact on performance of banks, respectively, in the growth of ROA and ROE. This may be due to the fact that external directors may have greater expertise and are more objective, professional and independent during the decision-making process. This result rejects the zero hypothesis (H0), where it is foreseen that there is no positive and significant relationship between the independence of the board of directors and the performance of banks in Kosovo, so alternative hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The result of this hypothesis is in accordance with the research findings of authors Delis et.al (2010) , Boussaada dhe Karmani (2015) , ), Adams (2011 , but contradicts with the findings of authors Ozcan (2016) and Al-Baidhani (2015) .
Regarding the control variables included in the regression analysis, model 2a shows a significant positive relationship between the bank size (r = 2.06e-7, p = 0.0084) and ROA, which implies that an increase in bank size, will affect the bank's financial performance (ROA). Other control variables such as credit risk (RRK) and liquidity risk (RRL) have shown positive relationships with ROA, but their effect is not significant (p = 0.1511 and p = 0.4552), while deposits (D) have shown negative and not significant results (r = -2.34e-7, p = 0.1052). Similar results were also noted in model 2b, where a significant positive impact was observed between the bank's size and ROE (r = 2.01e-6, p = 0.0421), while the non-significant positive effect was observed between ISSN: 2147-4486 Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders.
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credit risk (r = 0.9932, p = 0.1115) and ROE as well as liquidity risk (r = 0.0494, p = 0.2818) and ROE, while non-significant negative impact was observed also between deposits (r = -2.23e-6, p = 0.0626) and ROE.
The coefficient R 2 of model 2a is 0.1894 while model 2b is 0.6421, which means that model 2a has the ability to explain 18.94% of changes in ROA of commercial banks in Kosovo, while model 2b has the ability to account for 64.21% of changes in bank ROE commercial in Kosovo. 
Conclusions
The main purpose of this research was to analyze and study the relationship between the corporate governance metrics such as board size and board independence and its impact on financial performance of the banking sector in Kosovo during the period 2006-2017. The following are the main findings of the research regarding the impact of the Board of Directors on the financial performance of the banking sector in Kosovo. The findings were analyzed for five (2) independent variables of the board of directors. In addition to discussing the findings, this section will also list the recommendations according to the findings of the research. Based on the descriptive analysis, it has been identified that the average size of the board of directors of banks in Kosovo during the time period 2006-2017 is 5, with a maximum number of 8 and a minimum of 4. Also, based on the results of the multiple regression panel data is confirmed that the board of directors size has had a positive and significant impact on banks' financial performance in Kosovo, hence, this variable should be considered as an important variable for the banking system in Kosovo. The size of the boards of Kosovo banks can be considered as small as, according to Coleman and Biekpe's suggestions, the optimum level of board of directors for a bank varies from 11 to 15 (Biekpe, 2018) . The results of other authors' research suggest that boards (above 11-15 members) are considered to be less effective, efficient and the level of co-ordination of decisions is more difficult. Therefore, based on the findings of this research, it is recommended that the level of the board of directors of the banking sector in Kosovo should not exceed 11, i.e. not become 'large boards', which are considered not to have a positive impact on banks' financial performance.
Based on the descriptive analysis, it has been identified that the average value of the independence of the board of directors of banks in Kosovo during the time period 2006-2017 is 50.2%, which means that half of the board members of commercial banks in Kosovo are non-executive (external) while the other half are internal director (executive). Also, based on the results of the multiple regression panel data, it has been concluded that the independence of the board of directors has had a positive and significant impact on banks' financial performance, hence, this variable should be considered as an important variable for the banking system in Kosovo. Based on previous research by various authors, a high level of participation of external (non-executive) directors may not have such a positive effect on the banks and may not affect performance improvement, while the participation of a number of internal directors can have a positive impact. However, according to Baysinger & Butler (1985) , Ozcan (2016) , an optimal board should have a sufficient mix between executive and non-executive directors, as each party brings skills and expertise in the process of monitoring and supervising the bank's management. Therefore, based on the findings of this research, it is recommended that the level of non-executive (external) directors of the banking sector in Kosovo remain at the current level of 50%, as a very high number may not have such beneficial effects on banks in Kosovo.
Like any other research, this research may also have many limitations that are listed below and which should be taken into account when evaluating the findings of the research:
• The ROA and ROE are used as a benchmark for bank performance. During the literature review phase, it has been noted that there are other performance measures that could have been used as dependent variables of this research, such as return on investment (ROI) and net interest margin (NIM). Therefore, if other performance measures were taken into account in the research, the results and recommendations could have been different, and therefore the results of the current research should be interpreted in the light of this limitation.
• The average number of commercial banks during the research period 2006-2017 is seven (7) and the number of analyzed variables is 15, resulting in 1260 total observations. However, the results would have been more powerful if the analysis would involve a larger number of banks, i.e., all the banks in the Western Balkans region.
• The research period is limited to twelve years (12 years), which can be considered as a sufficient time period for similar studies. However, a larger period of study would result in more powerful findings. It should be noted that the current research period is above the average of the periods investigated by other authors of this field.
• Only 2 independent Board of Directors and 4 control variables were taken into account. The research does not address other factors that may have had an impact on banks' financial performance, such as cost efficiency, inflation, gross domestic product (GDP), risk index, credit protocols composition, gender diversity of board members, etc. Therefore, future researchers can include these internal and external factors as well as other control variables.
Prospective researchers in this field can take into account the above specified limitations of this research and incorporate them into their research. Following are some of the proposals for further research in this area.
(i) Future researchers, as a variable for measuring the performance of commercial banks, except for ROA and ROE, can also use other coefficients such as return on investment (ROI) and net interest margin (NIM).
(ii) Sample size is considered to be taken across the region so that the results are more robust and comparable between countries, e.g., 'the impact of the board of directors in banks of the Western Balkans countries.
(iii) The research period should be taken for at least 15 years, so that the phenomenon is followed for a longer period and the results are more reliable and statistically more significant.
(iv) The control variables may include other factors that may have an impact on the performance of banks, including external factors and internal factors such as cost efficiency, inflation, gross domestic product (GDP) the risk index, the composition of the credit portfolio, etc.
